A Dialogue with the Data: the Bayesian foundations of iterative research in qualitative social science by Fairfield, Tasha & Charman, Andrew
  
Tasha Fairfield and Andrew Charman 
The Bayesian foundations of iterative 
research in qualitative social science: a 
dialogue with the data 
 






Fairfield, Tasha and Charman, Andrew (2018) The Bayesian foundations of iterative research in 
qualitative social science: a dialogue with the data. Perspectives on Politics. ISSN 1537-5927 (In 
Press) 
 
© 2018 American Political Science Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89261/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 




	  The Bayesian Foundations of Iterative Research in Qualitative Social Science:  
A Dialogue with the Data 
Forthcoming, Perspectives on Politics 
(accepted June 15, 2018) 
 
Tasha Fairfield (LSE)1 
 Dept. of International Development  
London School of Economics 
T.A.Fairfield@lse.ac.uk 
 
Andrew Charman  
Dept. of Physics  
University of California, Berkeley 
 
 
Abstract: We advance efforts to explicate and improve inference in qualitative research that 
iterates between theory development, data collection, and data analysis, rather than proceeding 
linearly from hypothesizing to testing. We draw on the school of Bayesian “probability as 
extended logic,” where probabilities represent rational degrees of belief in propositions given 
limited information, to provide a solid foundation for iterative research that has been lacking in 
the qualitative methods literature. We argue that mechanisms for distinguishing exploratory from 
confirmatory stages of analysis that have been suggested in the context of APSA’s DA-RT 
transparency initiative are unnecessary for qualitative research that is guided by logical 
Bayesianism, because new evidence has no special status relative to old evidence for testing 
hypotheses within this inferential framework. Bayesian probability not only fits naturally with 
how we intuitively move back and forth between theory and data, but also provides a framework 
for rational reasoning that mitigates confirmation bias and ad-hoc hypothesizing—two common 
problems associated with iterative research. Moreover, logical Bayesianism facilitates scrutiny of 
findings by the academic community for signs of sloppy or motivated reasoning. We illustrate 
these points with an application to recent research on state building. 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of the replication crisis, APSA’s transparency initiative, and surrounding 
debates, scholars have sought to revalue, explicate, and improve inference in qualitative research 
that proceeds in an inherently iterative manner, where prior knowledge informs hypotheses and 
data gathering strategies, evidence inspires new or refined hypotheses along the way, and there is 
continual feedback between theory and data.  This iterative style of research, which is common 
in process tracing and comparative historical analysis, diverges from norms that mandate 
differentiating and sequencing exploratory (theory-building, inductive) and confirmatory 
(theory-testing, deductive) stages of research.  Theory-testing purportedly requires new data that 
did not contribute to inspiring hypotheses, and any deviations from a specified research design 
should be reported.1  Furthermore, theory testing is generally granted higher status.2  
Advocates of iterative qualitative research have suggested the key to enhancing its status 
and improving inference lies in finding ways to conform to norms of differentiating exploration 
from confirmation and testing theory with new evidence.  Scholars have called for greater 
transparency about analytical sequencing3 and advocate various mechanisms for keeping track of 
when a hypothesis was devised relative to specific stages of data collection, including pre-
registration,4 online logging,5 or time-stamping data as “used” vs. “unused” throughout the 
research process.6  Meanwhile, a recent APSA joint-committee proposal for a political science 
registry asserts: “The basic analytical difference between induction and testing is as relevant to 
qualitative analysis as to quantitative.  ...The clearest evaluation of explanatory or theoretical 
propositions derives from a new set of observations.”7      
We present a different view of iterative research that is grounded in Bayesian “probability 
as extended logic” from the physical sciences,8 where probabilities represent rational degrees of 
belief in propositions given the inevitably limited information we possess.  From a logical 
Bayesian perspective, prescriptions for separating exploratory from confirmatory research build 
on false dichotomies between old vs. new evidence and inductive vs. deductive reasoning.  
Theory testing—understood in Bayesian terms as inference to best explanation using 
probabilistic reasoning—takes all evidence into account, regardless of whether it was known to 
the investigator at the time hypotheses were devised; new evidence has no special status relative 
to old evidence.  Scientific inference invariably entails a “dialogue with the data,” where we go 
back and forth between theory development, data collection, and data analysis, rather than a 
linear sequence from hypothesizing to testing.  
Our perspective highlights and aims to resolve an underlying tension in efforts to 
understand and improve qualitative research.  On the one hand, much of the best such research 
implicitly and intuitively, albeit not consciously, approximates the logic of Bayesian reasoning.  
On the other hand, proposals advocating crisp delineations between exploratory and 
confirmatory research are grounded in the frequentist inferential framework that still underpins 
most large-N analysis—a framework that is inapplicable to small-N case-study analysis.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Humphreys et al. 2013, 1; Monogan 2015. 
2 Bowers et al. 2015, 7; Lieberman 2016, 1057; Jacobs 2018. 
3 Yom 2015,11; Büthe and Jacobs 2015, 55 
4 Bowers et al. 2015; Jacobs 2018 
5 Yom 2018 
6 Kapiszewski et al. 2015b 
7 Bowers et al. 2015, 15 
8 Cox 1961, Jaynes 2003 
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Whereas separating theory-building from theory-testing is imperative within frequentism, it is 
unnecessary for Bayesian inference. 
Accordingly, this piece aims to make two central contributions.  First, we advance efforts 
to revalue iterative research by elucidating its Bayesian foundations and thereby providing a 
solid methodological basis that has been lacking in the qualitative methods literature.  Second, 
we explicate the safeguards Bayesianism provides against confirmation bias and ad-hoc 
hypothesizing, which make firewalls between theory building and theory testing unnecessary.  
We therefore argue that time-stamping and pre-registration (binding or non-binding) are not 
useful tools in qualitative research, regardless of the practical (in)feasibility of these approaches 
in particular research programs (e.g., analysis of existing historical data vs. generation of original 
data through expert interviews). We hope this piece will help inform discussion among multi-
method and qualitative scholars on the nature of inference in case-study research, as well as the 
relative costs and analytical benefits of measures that have been suggested for improving 
research transparency, beyond advocating transparency for transparency’s sake.   
We begin by overviewing the trajectory of methodological thinking on iterative research 
and situating our contribution within recent work on Bayesian process tracing (§2).  We then 
introduce the “logical” approach to Bayesian probability (§3).  We clarify how this framework 
differs from the frequentist paradigm, and we elucidate fundamental tenets of logical 
Bayesianism that mitigate the need for distinctions between exploratory and confirmatory 
research.  The key lies in recognizing that the terms “prior” and “posterior,” as applied to our 
degree of belief (or confidence) in whether a proposition is true or false, are not temporal 
notions.  Instead, they are purely logical concepts that refer to whether we have incorporated a 
given body of evidence into our analysis via Bayes’ rule.  Section 4 illustrates these points with 
an application to qualitative research on state building.  
Section 5 considers potential concerns regarding our arguments that within logical 
Bayesianism, there is no need to keep track of what the investigator knew when and that “old” 
evidence is just as good as “new” evidence for assessing rival hypotheses. Our response 
emphasizes that Bayesian probability in and of itself provides a framework for rational reasoning 
in the face of uncertainty that simultaneously helps inoculate against cognitive biases and opens 
analysis to scrutiny by other scholars for signs of such pitfalls.  While there are no magic bullets 
for ensuring and signaling honest and unbiased assessments of evidence in practice, drawing on 
Bayesian reasoning more consciously in qualitative research, discussing rival explanations more 
explicitly, and openly addressing observations that run counter to overall conclusions can help 
further those goals.  While scholars need familiarity with the basics of Bayesian probability to 
implement these suggestions, sophisticated technical training is not necessary to begin improving 
intuition and inference.   
 
2. Perspectives on Iterative Research  
Iterative research has a long tradition in social science.  Classic methodological discussions 
include Glaser and Strauss’s work, which emphasizes jointly collecting and analyzing data while 
developing and refining theory and concepts.  Yet these authors largely describe their goal as 
theory building—not theory testing, which entails “more rigorous approaches” that “come later 
in the scientific enterprise.”9       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Glaser and Straus 1967, 103 
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Differentiating between theory building and testing remains prevalent even in literature that 
questions KKV’s application of standards from large-N statistical inference to case studies.  
Ragin expressly criticizes KKV’s assertion that “we should not make it [our theory] more 
restrictive without collecting new data to test the new version of the theory,”10 but his response 
stops short of providing a methodological rationale; Ragin simply notes the practical infeasibility 
of KKV’s prescription when “the number of relevant cases is limited by the historical record to a 
mere handful.”11  Brady and Collier’s groundbreaking volume stresses the contribution of 
inductive research to theory innovation.12  But in emphasizing tradeoffs between different 
objectives, the volume leaves the dichotomy between theory building and theory testing largely 
intact.   
Similarly, contemporary process-tracing literature retains language that discriminates 
between induction and deduction.  Authors refer to inductive vs. deductive process tracing,13 
theory-building vs. theory-testing process tracing,14 and similar variants.15  Even when 
acknowledging that process tracing in practice involves a complex combination of theory 
construction and evaluation, these modes are still treated as analytically distinct,16 and ideally 
sequential, where “inductive discovery is followed by deductive process tracing” using 
“evidence independent of that which gave rise to the theory,” (quoting Bennett and Checkel).17   
The relationship between theory building and theory testing is receiving renewed attention 
in the context of debates over transparency.  Yom seeks to elevate the status of disciplined 
“inductive iteration” while highlighting “truly destructive” practices like “data mining, selective 
reporting, and ignoring conflicting results.”18  Yet Yom’s emphasis on “transparency in 
practice,” which calls for scholars to report when they “had to reconceptualize a causal 
mechanism as new information comes to light, ...tighten a theoretical argument..., or rewrite a 
process-tracing narrative,”19 essentially falls back on the linear research template he critiques, in 
that the only rationale for requiring such information about the temporal trajectory of the 
intellectual process lies in standard prescriptions to test inductively-inspired theory with new 
evidence—otherwise we are promoting transparency purely for transparency’s sake.  While we 
agree that scholars should be forthright when conducting iterative research, we will argue that 
there are few analytical benefits to reporting temporal details about how the research process 
unfolded. 
In reevaluating the relationship between theory building and theory testing, we take 
inspiration not only from the physical sciences but also from early work on Bayesian 
underpinnings of case-study research.  McKeown instigated a pioneering agenda by observing 
that KKV’s statistical world-view clashes with a logic of “folk Bayesianism:”   
Researchers...are ‘interactive processors.’  They move back and forth between 
theory and data, rather than taking a single pass through the data. ...one can 
hardly make sense of such activity within the confines of a classical theory of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 KKV 1994, 22  
11 Ragin 1997, 3  
12 Brady and Collier 2010 
13 Bennett and Checkel 2015, 7-8 
14 Beach and Pedersen 2013 
15 Mahoney 2015; Bowers et al. 2015, 15 
16 Mahoney 2015, 201-02 
17 Bennett and Checkel 2014, 268.  Van Evera (1997, 45-6) offers a dissenting view. 
18 Yom 2015, 4  
19 Yom 2015, 11  
 	   4 
statistics.  A [Bayesian] theory of probability that treats it as a process involving 
the revision of prior beliefs is much more consistent with actual practice...20  
Subsequent scholarship makes important strides towards applying Bayesian reasoning in process 
tracing.21  But implications of McKeown’s observation about “interactive processing” have not 
yet been explored.  Formal treatments of Bayesian process tracing have been cast in a deductive, 
theory-testing framing that emphasizes prospective anticipations about evidence we might 
encounter, without elucidating the importance of inferential feedback and the role played by 
induction in conjunction with retrospective analysis of data actually obtained.      
We build on McKeown’s insights by arguing that logical Bayesianism provides a firm 
methodological foundation for iterative research.  In the apt phrase of astrophysicist Stephen 
Gull, Bayesian analysis involves a “dialogue with the data.”22  We draw new insights through a 
continual, iterative process of analyzing data differently and/or more deeply, revising and 
refining theory, revisiting evidence, asking new questions, and deciding what kinds of additional 
data to collect.  Inference is always provisional, in that theories are rarely definitively refuted or 
confirmed—they are constantly amended in light of new ideas and new data.  In these inferential 
cycles we never “use up” or “throw away” previous information—Bayesianism mandates 
learning from accumulated knowledge via conditional probabilities that take into account all 
relevant known information.  Confidence in one proposition depends on what else we know and 
generally changes when we make new observations.  There is no need within logical 
Bayesianism to temporally sequence inductive and deductive stages of reasoning.  Bayes’ rule 
allows us to move back and forth fluidly between reasoning about empirical implications of 
hypotheses and drawing inferences about possible causes from observed effects, and Bayesian 
probability allows us to assess the weight of evidence whether collected before or after 
formulating hypotheses.    
  
3. Bayesian Logic of Iterative Research 
We begin by reviewing conceptual distinctions between Bayesianism and frequentism, the 
dominant approach to quantitative inference which often informs how qualitative research is 
evaluated, and introducing the logical school of Bayesianism, which provides a prescription for 
rational reasoning given incomplete information (§3.1).  We then overview the mathematical 
framework of Bayesian inference (§3.2).  Section 3.3 resolves false dichotomies of new vs. old 
evidence and deductive vs. inductive research by focusing on the logical—not temporal—nature 
of “prior” and “posterior” probabilities.  Section 3.4 discusses safeguards built into logical 
Bayesianism that help curtail confirmation bias and ad-hoc hypothesizing—two potential pitfalls 
often associated with iterative research that underpin conventional demands for segregating 
theory building from theory testing. 
 
3.1 Bayesian Foundations     
Frequentism conceptualizes probability as a limiting proportion in an infinite series of 
random trials or repeated experiments.  For example, the probability that a coin lands “heads” on 
a given toss is equated with the fraction of times it turns up “heads” in an infinite sequence of 
throws.  In this view, probability reflects a state of nature—e.g., a property of the coin (fair or 
weighted) and the flipping process (random or rigged).  In contrast, Bayesianism understands 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 McKeown 1999, 180 
21 Bennett 2015; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Fairfield and Charman 2017 
22 Quoted in Sivia 2006 
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probability as a degree of belief based on a state of knowledge.  The probability an individual 
assigns to the next toss of a coin represents her strength of confidence about the outcome after 
taking into account all relevant information she knows. Two observers watching the same coin 
flip would rationally assign different probabilities to the proposition “the next toss will produce 
heads” if they have different information about the coin and/or tossing procedure.  For example, 
an observer who has had the opportunity to examine the coin in advance and discerns that it is 
weighted in favor of “heads” would rationally place a higher probability on that outcome than an 
observer who is not privy to such information.  
The Bayesian notion of probability offers multiple advantages—most centrally: it fits better 
with how people intuitively reason under uncertainty; it can be applied to any proposition, 
including causal hypotheses, which would be nonsensical from a frequentist perspective; it is 
well-suited for explaining unique events or working with a small number of cases, without need 
to sample from a larger population; and inferences can be made from limited amounts of 
information, using any relevant evidence (e.g., open-ended interviews, historical records), above 
and beyond data generated from stochastic processes.  These features make Bayesianism 
especially appropriate for qualitative research, which evaluates competing explanations for 
complex sociopolitical phenomena using evidence that cannot naturally be conceived as random 
samples (e.g., information from expert informants, legislative records, archival sources). Strictly 
speaking, “frequentist inference is inapplicable to the nonstochastic setting,” quoting Jackman 
and Western.23      
  The school of Bayesianism we advocate as the foundation for scientific inference—logical 
Bayesianism—seeks to represent the rational degree of belief we should hold in propositions 
given the information we possess, independently of hopes, subjective opinion, or personal 
predilections.  In ordinary logic, truth-values of all propositions are known with certainty.  But in 
most real-world contexts, we have limited information, and we are always at least somewhat 
unsure about whether a proposition is true or false.  Bayesian probability is an “extension of 
logic”24 in that it provides a prescription for how to reason when we have incomplete knowledge 
and are thus uncertain about the truth of propositions.  When degrees of belief assume limiting 
values of zero (impossibility) or one (certainty), Bayesian probability automatically reduces to 
ordinary logic.    
A central tenet of logical Bayesianism is that probabilities should encode knowledge in a 
unique, consistent manner.  Incorporating information in different but logically equivalent ways 
(e.g., learning the same pieces of information in different orders) must produce identical 
probabilities, and individuals possessing the same information must assign the same 
probabilities.  Cox, Jaynes, and subsequent scholars proved mathematically that if we represent 
degrees of confidence in the truth of propositions with real numbers and impose these 
consistency requirements, we are led directly to the standard sum and product rules of 
probability, which in turn give rise to all other operations for manipulating and updating 
probabilities.25   
The consistency requirements of logical Bayesianism are more demanding than 
requirements imposed in approaches that draw on the “psychological” or “subjective” school of 
Bayesianism common in the philosophy of science literature and many Bayesian statistics 
textbooks for social science.  In this latter personalistic approach, rationality requires 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jackman and Western 1994, 413 
24 Jaynes 2003 
25 E.g., Cox 1961; Jaynes 2003; Gregory 2005  
 	   6 
probabilities to be coherent, which means that utility-maximizing agents must decline “Dutch 
Book” bets, where loss is certain.  Coherence in turn implies that probabilities satisfy the sum 
and product rules.  But as long as probabilities satisfy these rules, they can be based on pure 
opinion or whim—whatever happens to motivate an individual to hold some particular subjective 
degree of belief. Accordingly, within psychological Bayesianism, individuals possessing the 
same information need not assign identical probabilities.   
We will show that the consistency requirements are the key to understanding the powerful 
methodological foundation that logical Bayesianism provides for iterative research.  First, 
however, we review the mechanics of Bayesian inference.     
 
3.2. Bayesian Inference  
Intuitively speaking, Bayesian reasoning is simply a process of updating our views about 
which hypothesis best explains the phenomena or outcomes of interest as we learn additional 
information.  We begin by identifying two or more alternative hypotheses.  The literature we 
have read along with our own previous experiences and observations give us an initial sense, or 
“prior” view, about how plausible each hypothesis is—e.g., before heading into the field or the 
archives, do we believe the median-voter theory is a much stronger contender for explaining 
levels of redistribution in democracies than approaches focusing instead on the power of 
organized actors including business associations and social movements?  Or are we highly 
dubious that the median-voter hypothesis provides an accurate explanation for the politics of 
inequality?  As our research proceeds, we ask whether the evidence we gather fits better with one 
hypothesis as opposed to another.  When we have finished collecting data, we arrive at a 
“posterior” view regarding which hypothesis is most plausible.  Bayes’ rule provides a 
mathematical framework for how we should revise our confidence in a given hypothesis, 
considering both our previous knowledge and the information we discovered during our 
research.  If we remain too uncertain about which hypothesis performs best after analyzing the 
data in hand, we may continue our research and collect additional evidence.    
Stated more formally, Bayesian inference generally proceeds by assigning prior 
probabilities to salient rival hypotheses.  These prior probabilities represent our rational degree 
of belief (or confidence) in the truth of each hypothesis taking into account all relevant initial 
knowledge, or background information (I), that we possess.  Symbolically, we represent the prior 
probability for hypothesis H as P(H|I).  This follows the conventional notation whereby a 
conditional probability P(A|B) represents the rational degree of belief that we should hold in 
proposition A given proposition B—that is, how likely is A if we take proposition B to be true.  
We then consider evidence E obtained during the investigation at hand.  The evidence includes 
all observations (beyond our background information) that bear on the plausibility of the 
hypotheses.  Finally, we employ Bayes’ rule to update our degree of confidence in hypothesis H 
in light of evidence E:   
P(H|EI) = P(H|I)×P(E|HI)⁄P(E|I) .               (1)  
On the left-hand side of Bayes’ rule, P(H|EI) is the posterior probability of H given evidence E 
and background information I.  On the right-hand side, P(H|I) is the prior probability discussed 
above, and P(E|HI) is the likelihood of the evidence—the probability of observing evidence E if 
the hypothesis is actually true.  In the denominator, P(E|I) acts as a normalization factor.  Bayes’ 
rule is nothing more than a rearrangement of the product rule of probability: 
P(AB) = P(BA) =P(A|B)×P(B) = P(B|A)×P(A) ,             (2) 
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where we substitute H and E for propositions A and B, while also explicitly conditioning all 
probabilities on our background information I.26  
Because inference always involves comparing hypotheses, it is easier to work with the 
odds-ratio form of Bayes’ rule: 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸𝐼𝑃 𝐻! 𝐸𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐻! 𝐼)𝑃 𝐻!|𝐼 × 𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!𝐼𝑃 𝐸 𝐻!𝐼                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       (3)  
 
where the factor P(E|I) conveniently cancels out. The factor on the left-hand side represents the 
posterior odds on hypothesis Hi  relative to Hj —namely, how much more plausible one 
hypothesis is vs. a rival hypothesis in light of the evidence learned as well as the background 
information we initially brought to the problem.  The first factor on the right-hand side is the 
prior odds—the plausibility of one hypothesis compared to the other based only on our 
background information.  For posterior odds and prior odds, we can think in terms of how 
willing we would be to bet in favor of one hypothesis vs. the other.  The second factor on the 
right-hand side is the likelihood ratio—how plausible the evidence is under one hypothesis 
relative to the other, or in other words, how likely the evidence would be if we assume Hi is true, 
compared to how likely the evidence would be if we instead assume Hj is true. The odds-ratio 
form of Bayes’ rule states that the posterior odds equal the prior odds multiplied by the 
likelihood ratio.  Bayes’ rule tells us that evidence fits better with a hypothesis Hi than an 
alternative Hj to the extent that Hi makes the evidence more plausible.  How much we end up 
favoring one hypothesis over another depends on both our prior views and the extent to which 
the evidence weighs in favor of one hypothesis over another. 
Assessing likelihood ratios P(E|HiI)⁄P(E|HjI) is therefore the critical inferential step that 
tells us whether evidence E should make us more or less confident than we were initially in one 
hypothesis relative to a rival. The likelihood ratio can be thought of as the probability of 
observing E in a hypothetical world where Hi is true, relative to the probability of observing E in 
an alternative world where Hj is true.  When evaluating likelihoods of the form P(E|HiI), we 
must in effect (a) suppress our awareness that E is a known fact, and (b) suppose that Hi is 
correct, even though the actual status of the hypothesis is uncertain.  Recall that in the notation of 
conditional probability, everything that appears to the right of the vertical bar is either known, or 
assumed as a matter of conjecture when reasoning about the probability of the proposition to the 
left of the bar.  In qualitative research, we need to “mentally inhabit the world” of each 
hypothesis (Hunter 1984) and ask how surprising (low probability) or expected (high probability) 
the evidence E would be in each respective world.  If E seems less surprising in the “Hi world” 
relative to the “Hj world,” then that evidence increases our odds on Hi vs. Hj.27  Again, we gain 
confidence in a given hypothesis to the extent that it makes the evidence we observe more 
plausible compared to rivals.    
Assessing likelihoods entails thinking about how consistent the evidence is with the world 
of the hypothesis in question.  Would the events, decisions, and statements that E represents 
follow plausibly and naturally in the world of a particular hypothesis? Or would they seem 
unusual and unexpected, perhaps requiring additional flukes, coincidences, or complex chains of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Accordingly, from the right-hand side of equation (2) we have: P(H|EI)×P(E|I) = P(E|HI)×P(H\I).  Dividing both 
sides by P(E|I) yields equation (1).  
27 Note that the plausibility of the evidence under a particular hypothesis can be extremely small if events could 
reasonably have unfolded in a multitude of different ways.  However, because we are working with likelihood 
ratios, we need not worry about exactly how (im)plausible the evidence is under Hi or Hj.  Instead, we focus on how 
much more or less likely what did happen becomes under Hi relative to Hj.          
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intervening events to occur?  Here it may be helpful to consider Coleridge’s notion of “willing 
suspension of disbelief.” When reading a story involving supernatural forces or time travel, for 
example, the conjured world might strike us as highly implausible—meaning that P(H|I) is very 
low.  But if we nevertheless provisionally accept this hypothesized world, the story should feel 
compelling and self-consistent, obeying the internal logic of the imagined world—meaning that 
P(E|HI) for the events that unfold should not be too low compared to other scenarios we can 
envision. 
Elsewhere, we elaborate guidelines for explicit Bayesian analysis in qualitative research, 
which entails quantifying all probabilities.28  To illustrate how Bayesian logic can be applied 
heuristically—i.e., without specifying numerical values for probabilities—consider an example 
drawing on Kurtz’s state-building research.29  We wish to ascertain whether the resource-curse 
hypothesis, or the warfare hypothesis (assumed mutually exclusive), better explains institutional 
development in Peru:  
HR  = Mineral resource dependence is the central factor hindering institutional 
development.  Mineral wealth makes collecting taxes irrelevant and creates 
incentives for subsidies and patronage, instead of building administrative capacity. 
HW  = Absence of warfare is the central factor hindering institutional development. Without 
external threats, leaders lack incentives to collect taxes and build administrative 
capacity for military defense.    
For simplicity, suppose we have no relevant background knowledge about state-building in Peru.  
Since both hypotheses find substantial support in literature on other countries, we might 
reasonably assign even prior odds.  We now learn the following:  
E1 = Peru faced persistent military threats following independence, its economy was long 
dominated by mineral exports, and it never developed an effective state. 
Intuitively, E1 strongly favors the resource-curse hypothesis.  Applying Bayesian reasoning, we 
must evaluate the likelihood ratio P(E1|HRI)⁄P(E1|HWI).  Imagining a world where HR is the 
correct hypothesis, mineral dependence in conjunction with weak state capacity is exactly what 
we would expect, and external threats are not surprising given that a weak state with mineral 
resources could be an easy and attractive target for invasion.  In the alternative world of HW, E1 
would be quite surprising; something very unusual, and hence improbable, must have happened 
for Peru to end up with a weak state if the warfare hypothesis is nevertheless correct, because 
weak state capacity despite military threats contradicts the expectations of the theory.  Because 
E1 is much more probable under HR relative to HW—that is, P(E1|HRI) is much greater than 
P(E1|HWI)—the likelihood ratio is large, and it significantly boosts our confidence in the 
resource-curse hypothesis.    
 
3.3.  Prior vs. Posterior Probabilities and Old vs. New Evidence 
While testing hypotheses with new evidence is pervasively espoused, distinctions between 
old and new evidence, and hence exploratory and confirmatory research, are far less 
consequential within logical Bayesianism compared to frequentism or psychological/subjective 
Bayesianism.  To be clear, “new evidence” refers to information unknown to the scholar before 
devising the hypothesis—regardless of the historical timing of when that information was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Fairfield and Charman 2017 
29 Kurtz 2009  
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generated.  For example, in Figure 1, E1 is old evidence relative to H, whereas E2 is new 
evidence, even though E2 existed before E1.     
 
 





The key to unraveling the false dichotomies lies in understanding that prior and posterior 
are not temporal notions—they are logical notions.  In astro-statistician Tom Loredo’s words:   
There is nothing about the passage of time built into probability theory. 
...‘prior probability,’ and ‘posterior probability’ do not refer to times before or 
after data is available. They refer to logical connections, not temporal ones. 
Thus, to be precise, a prior probability is the probability assigned before 
consideration of the data.30   
In other words, prior and posterior refer to degrees of belief before and after a piece of evidence 
is incorporated into our analysis—not to the timing of when we happened to learn or obtain that 
evidence.  Prior/posterior describe idealized states of knowledge without/with specific pieces of 
evidence included.  Hypotheses can contain temporal structuring, and evidence can contain 
temporal information.  However, probabilities themselves carry no intrinsic time-stamps.  
These points merit expounding. Recall that within logical Bayesianism, only the data at 
hand and the background knowledge are relevant for assessing the degree of belief that a 
hypothesis merits.  Nothing else about our state of mind should influence our probabilities.  The 
relative timing of when we stated the hypothesis, worked out its implications, and gathered data 
falls into this later category of logical irrelevance.   
To further stress the logical irrelevance of keeping track of what we knew when, the rules 
of conditional probability mandate that we can incorporate evidence into our analysis in any 
order without affecting the posterior probabilities. Using the product rule (2) and commutativity, 
the joint likelihood of two pieces of evidence can be written in any of the following equivalent 
ways:  
P(E1E2|HI) = P(E2E1|HI) = P(E1|E2HI)×P(E2|HI) = P(E2|E1HI)×P(E1|HI).           (4) 
Evidence learned at time one (E1) may thus be treated as logically posterior to evidence learned 
at time two (E2).  If in practice conclusions differ depending on the order in which evidence was 
incorporated, there is an error in our reasoning that should be corrected.  Otherwise we have 
violated the fundamental notion of rationality that lies at the heart of logical Bayesianism 
(§3.1)—information incorporated in equivalent ways should lead to the same conclusions.  
Once we recognize that timing is irrelevant in probability theory, it follows that each step 
below is logically distinct: 
• drawing on evidence E to inspire hypotheses;31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Loredo 1990, 87 
31 Inventing hypotheses is a creative process that falls outside probability theory, or any other inferential framework.  
Quoting MacKay (2006, 346): “Bayes does not tell you how to invent models.” 
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• assigning prior probabilities to those hypotheses given background information I that 
does not include E; 
• assessing the likelihood of E under alternative hypotheses to derive posterior 
probabilities. 
Information is neither “exhausted” nor “double-counted” in this process (Appendix A expounds). 
All relevant knowledge can be sorted as convenient into background information on which all 
probabilities are conditioned, and evidence that we use to update probabilities.   
Psychological/subjective approaches to Bayesianism often diverge from logical 
Bayesianism on these points, because the former focus on individuals’ personal degrees of belief 
and how their psychological states evolve over time.  Jeffrey’s “probability kinematics” is a 
prominent example;32 his approach introduces non-standard rules for updating that violate the 
laws of probability and imply that the order in which evidence is analyzed can matter.33   
In sum, probability theory requires keeping track of what information has been 
incorporated into our analysis, not when that information was acquired.34  Time-stamps 
indicating when hypotheses were composed or when evidence was observed or incorporated are 
not relevant to scientific inference.35      
 
3.4. Curtailing Confirmation Bias and Ad-Hoc Theorizing     
 Careful application of Bayesian logic helps guard against confirmation bias and ad-hoc 
hypothesizing in iterative research.  We consider these dual pitfalls in turn. 
Two common variants of confirmation bias entail overfocusing on data that fit a particular 
hypothesis and/or overlooking data that undermine it, and focusing on a single favored 
hypothesis while forgetting to consider whether data consistent with that hypothesis might be as 
or more supportive of a rival hypothesis.  A common recommendation for precluding such biases 
entails identifying observable implications of rivals as well as the main working hypothesis 
before gathering data.36  However, this advice can be problematic for two reasons.   
First, deducing observable implications beforehand may be infeasible, because any 
hypothesis may be compatible with a huge number of possible evidentiary findings—just with 
varying probabilities of occurrence.  For qualitative research on complex socio-political 
phenomena, there is essentially no limit to the different kinds of evidence we might encounter, 
and there is no way to exhaustively catalogue these infinite possibilities in advance.   
Second, anticipating observable implications may foster even greater bias.  If we have 
already elaborated hypotheses to be considered and evidence expected under each, we are now 
better situated to seek out the sorts of evidence that will support our pet theory, compared to a 
situation where we collect evidence without necessarily anticipating what will support which 
hypothesis.  This caveat embodies classic advice from Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes: “It is a capital 
mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, 
instead of theories to suit facts,” (A Scandal in Bohemia).    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Jeffrey 1983  
33 Another salient example is the so-called “new problem of old evidence” (Appendix B).  
34 Jefferys 2007 
35 In physics, hypotheses often derive support from evidence known long before they were developed; e.g., quantum 
mechanics was devised to explain known facts about blackbody radiation, atomic stability, and the photoelectric 
effect.   
36 E.g., Bennett and Checkel 2015, 18.  
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Risks of confirmation bias can be better controlled by conscientiously endeavoring to 
follow Bayesian reasoning.  Tendencies to seek evidence that supports a favored hypothesis, 
interpret evidence as overly favorable to that hypothesis, and underweight evidence that runs 
against that hypothesis are counteracted by following Bayesian prescriptions to condition 
probabilities on all relevant information available, without presuming anything beyond what is in 
fact known, or bringing mere opinions or desires into the evaluation.  Furthermore, remembering 
that the critical inferential step in Bayesian inference entails assessing likelihood ratios, P(E|HjI) 
⁄P(E|HkI), precludes the pitfall of restricting attention to a single hypothesis—we must always 
ask whether a given explanation makes the evidence more or less likely compared to rivals.  
In contrast to confirmation bias, the dual problem of ad-hoc hypothesizing involves over-
tailoring an explanation to fit a particular, contingent set of observations.  This danger underpins 
calls for distinguishing exploration from confirmation and testing hypotheses with new 
data.  Within logical Bayesianism, however, an ad-hoc hypothesis that is too closely tailored to 
fit arbitrary details of the data incurs a low prior probability, which protects us from favoring it 
over a simpler hypothesis that adequately explains the data.  If an explanation is ad-hoc, careful 
consideration should reveal that it is just one member of a large family of more or less equally 
ad-hoc hypotheses, characterized by multiple parameters or arbitrary choices that must be fine-
tuned to the data.  Each of these related hypotheses might explain a different set of contingent 
facts, yet none of them would seem any more credible than the others in the absence of the 
particular body of observations obtained.  Even if the overall prior probability of the family of 
hypotheses {H1 or H2 or...HN} is appreciable, this prior probability must be spread over all of the 
constituent possibilities, such that the prior for any particular Hi will be small.    
Consider an example adapted from astrophysicist Bill Jefferys.37  A stranger at a party 
shuffles a deck of cards, and you draw the six of spades.  We might reasonably hypothesize that 
this card was arbitrarily selected from a randomly-shuffled deck (HR).  A rival hypothesis 
proposes that the stranger is a professional magician relying on a trick deck that forces you to 
draw the six of spades (H6♠).  While the likelihood of selecting this particular card is 1/52 under 
HR, it is far larger under H6♠.  However, H6♠ must be penalized by a factor of 1/52 relative to HR, 
because without observing your draw, there would be no reason to predict the six of spades as 
the magician’s forced card.  H6♠ should be treated as one of 52 equally plausible related 
hypotheses whereby the magician forces some other card.  Accordingly, our single draw 
provides insufficient evidence to boost the credibility of H6♠ above HR.  
Logical Bayesianism thus penalizes complex hypotheses if they do not provide enough 
additional explanatory power relative to simpler rivals, in line with Occam’s razor and Einstein’s 
dictum that things should be as simple as possible, but no simpler.  In quantitative analysis, this 
task is accomplished via Occam factors that are automatically built into Bayesian probability.38  
Appendix C discusses Occam factors in more detail and illustrates how the penalty of 1/52 in our 
card-draw example emerges when we formally apply Bayesian analysis. 
In qualitative social science, the role of Occam factors in penalizing overly-complex 
explanations was first highlighted by Western.39  Although many authors identify complexity of 
theories with the number of assumptions or causal factors, there are no universal prescriptions 
for assessing how ad-hoc a hypothesis is in qualitative research.  Our recommended stratagem 
entails scrutinizing new hypotheses to evaluate how much additional complexity they introduce 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Jefferys 2003 
38 Jaynes 2003, 601-07; MacKay 2003, 343-356; Gregory 2005, 45-50 
39 Western 2001 
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compared to rivals.  If the hypothesis invokes many more causal factors or very specific or 
elaborate conjunctions of causal factors, good practice would entail penalizing its prior relative 
to the rivals, although it can be difficult to judge precisely the tradeoff between simplicity and 
explanatory power—a point Western also stresses.40  
In sum, within logical Bayesianism, likelihood ratios help guard against confirmation bias, 
while priors help guard against ad-hoc hypothesizing.  These safeguards are absent within 
frequentism, where hypothesis testing usually focuses on the probability of the data only under 
the null hypothesis, rather than relative likelihoods under rival hypotheses, and where the 
concept of probability applies only to data obtained through a stochastic sampling procedure, not 
to hypotheses.  Frequentist inference therefore requires pre-specifying sampling and analysis 
procedures in detail to avoid confirmation bias, and strictly separating data used in theory-
building from data used for theory-testing to prevent ad-hoc hypothesizing, whereas such 
strictures are unnecessary for Bayesian inference.   
 
4. Iteration in Practice 
We have argued that within logical Bayesianism, there is no need for firewalls between 
theory-building and theory-testing, and no need to rely exclusively on “new evidence” when 
testing hypotheses.  All we must do is carefully assign prior odds in light of our background 
information, and carefully assess likelihood ratios for all relevant evidence under our rival 
hypotheses.  This section illustrates how these points apply to qualitative research by extending 
the state-building example introduced in §3.2.  We make no claims about how Kurtz’s research 
process unfolded.  Instead, we draw on hypotheses and evidence from his published work to 
show how an iterative dialog with the data can give rise to inferences that are as valid as in a 
purely deductive approach, where all hypotheses were devised prior to data collection.  
 After comparing the resource-curse and warfare hypotheses in light of E1 (military threats, 
mineral wealth, and weak state), suppose we learn the following:  
E2 = Throughout the 1880s, Peruvian agriculture relied on an enormous semiservile labor 
force.  When Chile invaded, Peruvian elites were far more concerned that peasants 
remain under control than they were with contributing to national defense. The 
mayor of Lima openly hoped for a prompt Chilean occupation for fear that subalterns 
might rebel. The agrarian upper class not only refused to support General Cáceres’ 
efforts to fight back, but actively collaborated with Chilean occupiers because of 
Cáceres’ reliance on armed peasant guerillas.41  
This evidence might inspire a new hypothesis:      
HLRA = Labor-repressive agriculture is the central factor hindering institutional 
development.  Elites resist taxation and centralized control over coercive institutions, 
because they fear greater vulnerability to local rebellions.42  
To assess which hypothesis better explains the evidence acquired thus far, we must return to our 
background information and reassign priors across the new hypothesis set: HR, HW, and the 
inductively-inspired HLRA.  We then assess likelihood ratios for the aggregate evidence E1E2.  
For priors, strictly speaking we should assess the plausibility of each hypothesis taking into 
account all information accumulated in previous state-building literature.  However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Western 2001, 375 
41 Kurtz 2009, 496 
42 Kurtz 2009, 485 
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systematically incorporating all of our background information is infeasible in social science.  
Given practical limitations, one reasonable approach keeps equal odds on HR vs. HW but gives 
HLRA a moderate penalty relative to each rival, thereby acknowledging the novelty of this 
hypothesis with respect to existing state-building research and anticipating skepticism among 
readers.  Another reasonable option places equal odds on all three hypotheses, considering that 
HLRA is grounded in a longstanding research tradition originated by Barrington Moore.43  While 
HLRA is not discussed in state-building literature, labor-repressive agriculture has been identified 
as a crucial factor affecting other macro-political outcomes including regime type, so a-priori we 
might expect this factor to be salient for state-building as well.  Furthermore, although HLRA was 
introduced post-hoc (in light of E2), it is no more or less ad-hoc compared to the rivals—upon 
inspection, none of the three hypotheses seems appreciably more complex than the others.  Each 
identifies a single structural cause that operates by shaping actors’ incentives.44 
Turning to the evidence, the easiest way to proceed entails assessing likelihood ratios for 
HLRA vs. HR and HLRA vs. HW.  Since the overall likelihood ratio factorizes:  𝑃 𝐸!𝐸! 𝐻!𝐼𝑃 𝐸!𝐸! 𝐻!𝐼 = 𝑃 𝐸! 𝐻!𝐼𝑃 𝐸! 𝐻!𝐼 × 𝑃 𝐸! 𝐸!𝐻!𝐼𝑃 𝐸! 𝐸!𝐻!𝐼                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (5)    
 
we first consider E1 and then E2.  
E1 moderately favors HR over HLRA.  As explained in §3.2, E1 fits quite well with the 
resource-curse hypothesis.  However, E1 is not surprising under HLRA; a weak state with mineral 
resources would still be an easy and attractive target for invasion if labor-repressive agriculture 
were the true cause of state weakness.  Nevertheless, resource dependence in conjunction with 
state weakness makes E1 more expected under HR.  In contrast, E1 strongly favors HLRA over HW: 
whereas this evidence is unsurprising under HLRA, it is highly unlikely under HW (§3.2).     
E2 very strongly favors HLRA over each alternative.  Neither HW nor HR speaks to the nature 
of agricultural relations, whereas in the world of HLRA, semi-servile labor is highly expected 
given that Peru has a weak state (E1).45  Furthermore, under either HW or HR, the behavior of 
Peruvian elites described in E2 would be extremely surprising—we would instead expect them to 
resist the Chilean incursion (however ineffectively, given state weakness) in an effort to retain 
control over their territory and mineral resources.  In contrast, their behavior fits quite well with 
HLRA in showing that elites’ concern over maintaining subjugation of the labor force undermined 
the most basic function of the state—national defense.  Of course, we know E2 fits well with 
HLRA since the former inspired the latter; however, the critical inferential point is that E2 is much 
more plausible under HLRA relative to the alternatives.  Accordingly, this evidence very strongly 
increases the odds in favor of HLRA.  
Overall, the likelihood ratio (5) strongly favors HLRA over both alternatives.  E2 overwhelms 
the moderate support that E1 provides for HR.  And all of the evidence weighs strongly against 
HW.  Accordingly, HLRA emerges as the best explanation given the evidence acquired thus far.  If 
we begin with a moderate penalty on HLRA, the posterior still favors that hypothesis, although the 
higher the prior penalty, the more decisive the overall evidence needed to boost the plausibility 
of HLRA above its competitors.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Kurtz 2009, 485 
44 An argument could potentially be made that HW is somewhat simpler than the rivals, in that it can be articulated a 
bit more concisely and invokes a single, direct causal process.    
45 Here we are conditioning the likelihood of E2 on E1, as equation (5) requires.  See Fairfield and Charman (2017, 
370-71).  
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In essence, we have now “tested” an inductively-inspired hypothesis with “old evidence.”    
What matters is not when HLRA came to mind or which evidence was known before vs. after that 
moment of inspiration, but simply which hypothesis is most plausible given our background 
information and all the evidence.  Imagine that a colleague is familiar with all three hypotheses 
from the outset and shares essentially the same background knowledge, but has not seen E1E2.  
S/he would follow a logically identical inferential process in evaluating which hypothesis best 
explains the Peruvian case: assessing the likelihood of E1E2 under these rival hypotheses.  It 
would be irrational for two researchers with the same knowledge to reach different conclusions 
merely because of when they learned the evidence.   
To further emphasize the irrelevance of relative timing, we do not know from reading 
Kurtz’s article whether he invented HLRA before or after finding E2, but that chronological 
information would not make E2 any more or less cogent. Our goal is not to reproduce the order in 
which the neurons fired inside the author’s brain; it is to independently assess which hypothesis 
is most plausible in light of the evidence and arguments presented.  
Of course “new evidence” is often valuable for improving inferences by providing 
additional weight of evidence.  However, the goal of obtaining new evidence is not to supplant 
existing evidence that inspired the hypothesis, but rather to supplement that evidence and 
hopefully strengthen our inference.  Information is never intentionally disregarded in logical 
Bayesianism; any subsequent stage of research following the inspiration of a hypothesis must 
take all previously-obtained evidence into account through the prior probability on that 
hypothesis.  In our example, E2, which inspired HLRA, contributes to the strong posterior odds in 
favor of HLRA, which would in turn become the “prior odds” when analyzing additional evidence.     
 
5. Anticipated Concerns 
Logical Bayesianism is an aspirational ideal that usually cannot be fully realized in practice 
without approximations.  In qualitative social science, some degree of subjectivity inevitably 
enters when assigning probabilities.  There is no mechanical procedure for objectively translating 
complex, narrative-based, qualitative information into precise probabilities.  Despite 
conscientious efforts to follow Bayesian reasoning, we may still commit analytical errors.   
Accordingly, this section considers potential concerns with our argument that qualitative 
research need not demarcate theory-building vs. theory-testing.  Our overarching response draws 
on the premise that research is not only a dialogue with the data, but also a dialogue with a 
community of scholars.  Knowing the temporal trajectory of authors’ thought processes should 
not matter to how readers scrutinize inferences.  If scholars disagree with an author’s 
conclusions, logical Bayesianism provides a clear framework for pinpointing the loci of 
contention, which may lie in different priors and background information, and/or different 
interpretations of evidence.  Bayesian itself, whether applied explicitly or heuristically, lays 
analysis open for all to scrutinize on its own terms.  In contrast, it would be misguided to assume 
that if authors time-stamp hypotheses and evidence, their analysis is sound, whereas if such 
information is not reported, inferences lack credibility.  Regardless of whether temporal details 
about the research process are provided, scholars must evaluate hypotheses and evidence with 
their own independent brainpower.    
Our discussion includes guidelines for facilitating scholarly dialogue and improving 
inferences within a Bayesian framework, while highlighting shortcomings of prescriptions for 
labeling and/or separating exploratory/inductive vs. confirmatory/deductive research.  We 
address anticipated concerns regarding biased priors, biased likelihoods, and scholarly integrity. 
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5.1. Biased priors  
Concerns: (a) Given psychological difficulties in “getting something out of our mind,” we may 
be unable to assign priors that are not influenced by what we already know about our data.   
(b) Given vulnerabilities to cognitive biases, we may over-fit inductively-devised hypotheses to 
the evidence without adequately penalizing their priors.   
 
Pre-specifying priors is not a sensible solution.  We cannot assess a prior before devising 
the hypothesis, and once we formulate the hypothesis, all relevant information—both 
background knowledge and evidence Epre acquired thus far—must inform P(H|Epre I), which 
serves as the “prior” moving forward.  Moreover, whether we evaluate P(H|I) and then the 
likelihood for the total evidence ET =Epre Epost ultimately collected, P(ET|I), or whether we update 
along the way, evaluating P(H|Epre I) and then P(Epost |Epre HI)×P(H|Epre I), the final inference 
should be the same—consistency checks can help ensure equivalence.  The timing of when we 
assess or record priors is irrelevant.    
To guard against subconsciously-biased priors (concern (a)), best practices should include 
the following.  First, describe the most salient background information and explain why it 
motivates a particular choice of priors.  If priors are obviously biased in favor of an inductively-
derived hypothesis, beyond what is justified by the background information discussed, readers 
should notice the discrepancy. For instance, in our state-building example, readers might balk if 
our prior odds strongly favored HLRA over the well-established resource-curse and warfare 
hypotheses.  Likewise, if a well-known study or salient literature is overlooked, readers will 
request reconsideration of priors in light of that further background information.   
Second, consider conducting the analysis with equal prior odds, which avoids biasing 
initial assessments in favor of any hypothesis.  This approach shifts focus to likelihood ratios, 
with the aspiration that even if scholars disagree about priors—which will be almost inevitable 
given that everyone has different background information—we may still concur on the direction 
in which our odds on the hypotheses should shift in light of the evidence.  Third, consider using 
several different priors to assess how sensitive conclusions are to these initial choices, along the 
lines of our analysis in §4.  
For qualitative research that follows Bayesian logic heuristically, the first guideline entails 
carefully discussing the strengths and weaknesses of rival explanations based on existing 
literature, which is common practice.  The second guideline entails recognizing that readers may 
initially view a hypothesis with much more skepticism than the author, such that all parties in the 
scholarly dialogue should pay close attention to scrutinizing the evidence and the inferential 
weight it provides.  Authors should be conservative with their inferential claims until the weight 
of evidence becomes strong.   
Regarding concern (b), scholarly dialogue again serves as a corrective to sloppy analysis.  
If an inductive hypothesis manifesting multiple fine-tuned variables or inordinate complexity is 
granted too much initial credence, readers should notice and demand additional evidence to 
overcome an unacknowledged or underestimated Occam penalty (§3.4).  Beyond the simple 
advice to treat inductively-devised hypotheses with healthy skepticism, three suggestions can 
help curtail ad-hoc hypothesizing: start with reasonably simple theories and add complexity 
incrementally as needed; critically assess whether all casual factors in the theory actually 
improve explanatory leverage; and ask whether the explanation might apply more broadly.    
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In contrast, reporting the temporal sequencing of the research process in and of itself does 
not help ascertain how severe an Occam penalty a hypothesis should suffer.  The critical point is 
that a hypothesis that is post-hoc—devised after the evidence—is not necessarily ad-hoc—
arbitrary or overly complex.  These are distinct concepts.  As argued in §4, HLRA is post-hoc 
(relative to E2), but not ad-hoc, because it is no more arbitrary or complex than its rivals.   
 
5.2. Biased likelihoods  
Concern: We may succumb to confirmation bias in overstating how strongly evidence favors an 
inductively-derived hypothesis. 
  
Suggestions for pre-registration and time-stamping in qualitative research46 aim to address 
these concerns, on the premise that differentiating exploratory from confirmatory analysis allows 
us to more credibly evaluate inductively-inspired hypotheses.  Importing this prescription into a 
Bayesian framework would entail assigning likelihoods to clues we might encounter before 
gathering data.   
Even in light of human cognitive limitations, we find this approach unhelpful. Although a 
scholar’s prospective assessment of likelihoods for “new evidence” might be less prone to 
confirmation bias than retrospective analysis of “old evidence,” confirmation bias could just as 
easily intrude when gathering additional evidence—by subconsciously looking harder for clues 
that favor the working hypothesis and/or overlooking those that do not (§3.4).   
Moreover, we reiterate the impossibility of foreseeing all potential evidentiary observations 
in the complex world of social science.  Anticipating course-grained categories of observations is 
not adequate for specifying likelihoods for any actual, concrete evidence that might fit within 
that class, because specific details of evidence obtained can matter immensely to likelihoods 
under different hypotheses.  Consider the example Bowers et al. present in their discussion of 
pre-analysis plans for qualitative research: a government has cut taxes, and we wish to assess 
hypothesis HK = Tax cuts were motivated by an interest in Keynesian demand management.47  
The authors delineate evidence E=Records of deliberations among cabinet officials about the tax 
cut show “prominent mention of ...Keynesian stimulus,” and they judge the probability of finding 
such evidence if HK is true to be very high.  However, E as stated above is too vague to assign a 
meaningful likelihood in advance.  Here are two different clues we might encounter in the 
records: 
E'  = The Finance Minister invokes Keynesian stimulus when explaining the tax cuts to 
other cabinet members.  
E'' = One of the cabinet members comments that tax cuts are consistent with Keynesian 
stimulus, whereafter discussion is interrupted by derisive jokes about Keynesian 
economics.   
Suppose further that the time and attention devoted to these mentions of Keynesiansim are 
similar for E' and E'', such that both qualify as instances of E as articulated above, even though 
they carry very different import.  Whereas the likelihood of E' might well be high if HK is true, 
the likelihood of E'' certainly is not—E'' would be extremely surprising in a world where HK is 
correct.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Bowers et al. 2015; Kapiszewski et. al. 2015b; Jacobs 2018; Yom 2018, 420 
47 Bowers et al. 2015, 16-17 
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Bowers et al. recognize this “problem of precision,” noting that E as defined above “still 
leaves some things open.  Just how prominent do mentions of Keynesian logic have to 
be...?  How many actors have to mention it?  What forms of words will count as the use of 
Keynesian logic?”48  However, they underestimate the problem.  The issue is not just how many 
mentions or how many actors or what terms we associate with Keynesianism, but an endless 
array of other possibilities and nuances that depend on the context and manner in which 
Keynesianism is discussed. However much additional detail we specify before gathering data, we 
can always invent—and the real world may well produce—another twist or tweak that matters 
nontrivially.  Despite efforts to anticipate what might surprise us ahead of time, science advances 
most when evidence surprises us in unforeseen ways.    
Jaynes, an outspoken advocate of logical Bayesianism in the physical sciences, reinforces 
these key points:  
The orthodox line of thought [holds] that before seeing the data one will plan 
in advance for every possible contingency and list the decision to be made 
after getting every conceivable data set. The problem...is that the number of 
such data sets is usually astronomical; no worker has the computing facilities 
needed… We take exactly the opposite view: it is only by delaying a decision 
until we know the actual data that it is possible to deal with complex problems 
at all. The defensible inferences are the post-data inferences.49   
What matters is how sound the inferences are in light of the arguments and evidence presented, 
not in comparison to every twist and turn of analysis before the author arrived at the final 
conclusions, or what the author would have thought had the data turned out differently.   
Returning to the core concern of mitigating bias when assessing likelihoods, first, recall 
that inference always requires evaluating likelihood ratios, which forces us to ask how well the 
evidence fits with rival explanations.  Second, we reiterate our central point regarding scholarly 
scrutiny: if despite efforts to follow logical Bayesianism, a scholar nevertheless over-estimates 
how much the evidence favors an inductively-inspired hypothesis, readers can independently 
weigh that evidence and critically assess the author’s judgments.  Subsequent debate may 
encourage the author to bring more background information to light that was previously used 
implicitly, or acknowledge that the evidence is not as strong as previously maintained.  In our 
state-building example, readers might contest our assessment that E1E2 very strongly favors HLRA 
over HR, perhaps suggesting that this evidence only moderately favors the inductively-inspired 
hypothesis.  Open discussion would then result in greater consensus or at least greater clarity on 
why scholars interpret the evidence differently.   
 
5.3. Integrity 
Concern: We need mechanisms to discourage scholars from choosing procedures after the fact 
to get the results they want, or manipulating evidence to strengthen results.   
  
The first malpractice—post-hoc choice of analytical procedures—is a bigger concern for 
frequentist inference, which require predefined stochastic data-generation models.  Within a 
Bayesian framework for case-study research, we must make judgments about which hypotheses 
to consider, how to acquire evidence, and how to interpret that evidence.  However, the 
underlying inferential procedure remains the same: apply probabilistic reasoning to update 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Bowers et al. 2015, 16-17  
49 Jaynes 2003, 421  
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beliefs regarding the plausibility of rival hypotheses in light of relevant evidence.  Analysis 
always involves assessing priors, assessing likelihoods, and updating probabilities via Bayes’ 
rule.  Unlike frequentist statistics, there is no need to choose among sampling procedures, 
stopping rules, estimators, tests statistics, or significance levels. 
The second malpractice, e.g., deliberately cherry-picking evidence, can certainly occur in 
qualitative research.  However, time-stamping does little to deter such abuses.  Any scholar 
intent on exaggerating results or willing to commit fraud can find ways to do so regardless.  
Ansell and Samuels make similar observations regarding the related issue of results-blind 
review—it is always possible to “sweep dirt an author wants no one to see under a different 
corner of the publishing carpet.”50  As a device for signaling integrity, mechanisms like pre-
registration or time-stamping risk imposing a substantial burden of time and effort on honest 
scholars without preventing dishonest scholars from sending the same credibility signals.  Recall 
that the retracted LaCour-Green study was pre-registered, yet evidence of fraud was uncovered 
not by comparing the published article to the pre-registration plan, but by scrutinizing the article 
and accompanying dataset.51    
The only viable strategy in our view involves disciplinary norms.  First, we need a 
commitment to truth-seeking and scientific integrity.  As Van Evera observed long before DA-
RT: “Infusing social science professionals with high standards of honesty is the best solution.”52  
Second, adjusting publication norms regarding requisite levels of confidence in findings would 
mitigate incentives for falsely bolstering results.  For qualitative research, embracing Bennett and 
Checkel’s dictum, “conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is 
conclusive,”53 would be a major step toward reducing temptations to overstate the case in favor 
of the author’s hypothesis.  An associated best practice entails explicitly addressing the pieces of 
evidence that on their own run most counter to the overall inference; transparency of this type 
could both encourage critical thinking and signal integrity in a more meaningful way.  We 
recognize that these suggestions are neither panaceas nor quick fixes.  But in the long term, 
rethinking disciplinary norms and practices along these lines and adopting a more a Bayesian 
perspective could help us better acknowledge and communicate the uncertainty that surrounds 
our inferences, which is critical for scientific inquiry.   
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